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Balancing the Statute of Limitations and the
Discovery Rule: Some Victims of Incestuous
Abuse are Denied Access to Washington
Courts-Tyson v. Tyson
I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington Supreme Court, in Tyson v. Tyson,'
recently rendered a decision that will have a profound effect
on many victims of repeated incestuous abuse. In Tyson, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, her father, committed acts
of sexual molestation constituting assault, battery, outrage, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress when she was
between the ages of three and eleven years old.
The plaintiff reached the statutory age of majority on
April 20, 1975. She filed the complaint against her father in
August 1983, eight years after the commencement of the stat-
ute of limitations period and more than five years after its
expiration. The plaintiff asserted that her total mental block-
age of the fact that she was sexually abused; she had no mem-
ory of the events until she entered therapy one year before
filing her complaint.
The court considered the issue of whether the discovery
rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff
discovers or reasonably should have discovered a cause of
action, should apply to intentional torts. The intentional tort
in this case was past sexual abuse, which the victim had
blocked from conscious memory during the duration of the
statute of limitations.2 In a five to four opinion, the court
answered in the negative.
1. 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986). Although the victims of incest can be both
female and male children, the use of pronoun "she" for the victim and "he" for the
abuser in this article reflects that the majority of reported incest cases involve female
children and male abusers. See infra note 5.
2. Tyson v. Tyson, No. 51908-1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 1983). Defendant, plaintiff's
father, brought a motion for summary judgment arguing, primarily, that the claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff responded that the discovery rule
delays the accrual of the cause of action, thus, the claim was not time barred. The
District Court stayed its ruling pending certification of the issue to the Washington
Supreme Court since the issue of whether the discovery rule should apply to claims of
this kind is one of state law.
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The court's decision in Tyson is significant for two reasons.
The issue of applying the discovery rule to incest abuse cases
was one of first impression in Washington,3 and the Washing-
ton Supreme Court was the first state supreme court to even
consider the issue.4 The Washington court was given the
opportunity to provide court access to many incest victims who
are unable to bring suit against their offenders-their parents,
step-parents, or other relatives.5
3. There are two other cases in Washington in which the application of the
discovery rule was considered. In Gordon v. Williams, No. 82-2-0213-0 (Wash. Super.
Ct., Snohomish County, June 4, 1983), a twenty five year old incest victim filed suit
against her father seeking damages for incestuous assault, sexual battery and outrage.
The suit was filed five years after the last instance of sexual abuse and three years
after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.
The defendant in Gordon moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
statute of limitations barred recovery. The trial court held that the discovery rule did
apply. In addition, the court ruled that it was for the trier of fact to determine
whether the plaintiff began her action in a timely manner.
The defendant then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for discretionary
review of the trial court ruling. The defendant's petition was denied.
More recently, in Raymond v. Ingram, No. 83-2-14718-2 (Wash. Super. Ct., King
County, October 1985), the plaintiff who alleged sexual assault against her grandfather
(suit against the grandmother for negligence was dropped), was awarded $81,000 by a
jury. The assault had occurred in 1981, so that the suit was timely filed and came
within the statute of limitations. However, like the plaintiff in Tyson, the plaintiff in
Raymond had blocked out the memory of earlier abuse by her grandfather from the
age of four through fifteen. The 1981 assault triggered her memory, and she has since
suffered from recurring nightmares, chronic insomnia, digestive disorders, marital
distress and is in therapy.
4. Although legal commentators have focused on the issue of incestuous abuse and
have argued for the use of the discovery rule, no other state supreme court has ruled
on the issue. See generally Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of
Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 191 (1985); Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 609 (1983).
In 1984, the Court of Appeal of California, in Newlander v. Newlander, No. C-319-
815 (Cal. App. Dept. 2 Super. Ct. 1984), considered and rejected the creation of a
separate tort of incest as an equitable exception to the statute of limitations. The
proposal to create a tort of incest has been supported by one commentator in
Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's
Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. JOURNAL 189 (1984) (hereinafter Statute of Limitations
in Civil Incest Suits).
5. The overwhelming majority of incest cases involve female children and their
fathers. Incestuous abuse of boys appears to be less pervasive, perhaps due to
underreporting. J. HERMAN-LEWIS, & L. HIRSCHMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 14
(1981) (hereinafter HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN); R. SUMMIT, Beyond Belief The
Reluctant Discovery of Incest, WOMEN'S SEXUAL EXPERIENCE 127, 128 n.1 (1982)
(hereinafter SUMMIT).
The American Psychological Association estimates that 25% of incest cases involve
fathers and daughters, 25% involve step-fathers and step-daughters, while the
remaining 50% includes adoptive fathers, grandfathers, brothers, half-brothers, uncles,
and cousins. Brozan, "Helping to Heal the Scars Left by Incest," N. Y. Times, Jan. 9,
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Incest is a crime in Washington as it is in every state.6
Few incest cases are reported,7 and still fewer cases are prose-
cuted.8 Since many incest victims repress or bury deep within
their subconscious mind the memory of the incestuous abuse,9
they are unaware of the harm done to them until they are
adults. At that time, the incest victim can pursue a civil action
for damages against the offending parent.1 0 However, although
tort remedies exist, the statute of limitations remains an obsta-
cle that prevents many victims from gaining access to the
1984, at B2, col. 6 (hereinafter Brozan); see also Statute of Limitations in Civil Incest
Suits, supra note 4, at 189.
6. Bienen, "The Incest Statutes," reprinted in HERMAN-LEwIs & HiRscHMAN,
supra note 5, at 221-59 (Chart of criminal incest statutes on state-by-state basis).
The incest statute in Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.64.020 states:
Incest. (1) A person is guilty of incest in the first degree if he engages in
sexual intercourse with a person whom he knows to be related to him, either
legitimately or illegitimately, as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister of
either the whole or half blood.
(2) A person is guilty of incest in the second degree if he engages in
sexual contact with a person whom he knows to be related to him, either
legitimately or illegimately, as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister of
either the whole or the half blood.
(3) As used in this section, "descendant" includes stepchildren and
adopted children under eighteen years of age.
(4) As used in this section, "sexual contact" has the same meaning as
in the WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.100(2).
(5) As used in this section, "sexual intercourse" has the same
meaning as in WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(1).
(6) Incest in the first degree is a class B felony.
(7) Incest in the second degree is a class C felony.
7. In a telephone interview with Jim Teverbaugh, Director of the Governor's
Council on Child Abuse, Washington (November 6, 1985), Mr. Teverbaugh stated that
the number of reported incest cases is unknown, for they are included within the
category of child sexual abuse. In 1984, 9,487 cases of child sexual abuse were
reported. From January to May 1985, 4,546 new child sexual abuse cases were
reported. Mr. Teverbaugh speculated that there are still a number of sexual abuse
cases unreported. He noted that these cases show shifting figures. Five years ago 4%
or 5% of all child abuse cases reported were sexual abuse cases. In 1985, the
percentage increased to 24.8%.
8. Statistics for 1985 from the Office of the King County Prosecuting Attorney,
Sexual Assault Unit, show that in King County, Washington, of the 403 complaints of
familial sexual abuse of children under the age of eighteen, 256 were declined by the
Prosecutor's Office. Reasons for declining to prosecute include insufficient evidence to
make a criminal charge or the withdrawal of the complaint by the complainant. These
statistics, although representative of only one county in Washington state, reflect the
problems faced by incest victims in bringing suit at the time the incestuous abuse
occurs.
9. See infra notes 42-45.
10. See generally Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 609 (1983) (a comprehensive overview of civil tort remedies available to the
incest victim).
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courts." The Washington courts have applied the discovery
rule in a variety of cases in order to counteract the injustice of
the statute of limitations. 12 The discovery rule allows the stat-
ute of limitations to run when the plaintiff discovers or should
have reasonably discovered the injury.
The court's decision in Tyson not only denies access to the
courts for many victims of incest abuse, it also misinterprets
the well-developed reasoning and purpose of the discovery rule
in Washington law. This note addresses the court's reasoning
in Tyson in light of the incest victim and the nature of her
injury, with a focus on the justification for the statute of limi-
tations and the development of the discovery rule exception in
Washington law. This note then argues for the logical and just
extension of the discovery rule to cases involving the victims of
repeated incestuous abuse who discover the abuse after the
statute of limitations has run.
II. THE COURT'S HOLDING IN TYSON
The majority in Tyson held that the discovery rule will not
be applied to incest abuse cases, in the absence of objective,
verifiable evidence making it substantially certain that facts
can be fairly determined despite the passage of time from the
occurrence of the injury."' The court's refusal to extend the
discovery rule to victims of incestuous abuse rests on two
major issues: the nature of the victim's injury and the eviden-
tiary problem of proof created by potentially false or stale
claims.
Although the court recognizes that "child sexual abuse has
devastating impacts on the victim,"' 4 the victim's claim "rests
on a subjective assertion that wrongful acts occurred and that
injuries resulted."' 5  The court asserts that in prior cases
where the discovery rule was applied, there was objective, veri-
fiable evidence of the original wrongful act and the resulting
physical injury,'6 while in the case of an incest victim there is
11. See infra note 64.
12. See infra notes 150-164 and accompanying text.
13. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 79, 727 P.2d at 229.
14. Id. at 75, 727 P.2d at 227.
15. Id. at 77, 727 P.2d at 229.
16. E.g., Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (evidence of surgical
sponge left in patient); Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital, 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d
1358 (1979) (evidence that overexposure to oxygen in incubator caused objective
manifestation of blindness); Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 550, 663
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merely an "alleged recollection of a memory long buried in the
unconscious which she asserts was triggered by psychological
therapy.' 1 7 The court also asserts that there is no objective
manifestation of the allegations and that the fact that the
wrongful acts were discovered through therapy does not vali-
date their occurrence.
The majority is not only concerned with the problem of
speculative claims based on emotional injury, but also with the
unreliability of psychiatry and psychology: "Psychology and
psychiatry are imprecise disciplines. Unlike the biological sci-
ences, their methods of investigation are primarily subjective
and most of their findings are not based on physically observa-
ble evidence."' 8 The court points out that psychiatrists and
psychologists cannot necessarily aid in truth-finding and les-
sening the subjectivity of the plaintiff's claim, for the psycho-
analytic process itself can lead to the distortion of truth of
events because the analyst's own reactions and interpretations
may influence the subject's memory. 9
The court asserts that because the nature of the victim's
emotional injury is unverifiable and speculative, there is a seri-
ous danger of spurious claims being made against potential
defendants. In addition, the court notes that allowing poten-
tially spurious and stale claims creates evidentiary problems,
which the statute of limitations seeks to prevent.20
The Tyson opinion presents the traditional justification for
the statute of limitations, the problem of stale claims: "Stale
claims present major evidentiary problems which can seriously
undermine the ability to determine facts. ' 2 ' Among the
problems encountered are the disappearance of witnesses, the
lack of physical evidence, and the passage of time, which
makes witness testimony less reliable and trustworthy. Quot-
ing a landmark case in the development of the discovery rule,
the court notes that "with the passing of time, minor griev-
ances may fade away, but they may grow to outlandish propor-
P.2d 473 (1983) (evidence that continuous exposure to asbestos products for almost
forty years caused asbestosis).
17. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 77, 727 P.2d at 229.
18. Id. at 78, 727 P.2d at 229.
19. Id. See generally Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert
Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REV. 331 (1985).
20. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75, 727 P.2d at 227.
21. Id. at 76, 727 P.2d at 228.
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tions."22 The statute of limitations prevents the filing of stale
claims and thus enhances the fact finders's ability to resolve
issues fairly and accurately.
III. THE TRAUMA OF INCEST
A. The Child Victim
In order to discuss the court's decision in Tyson, an under-
standing of the incest victim and the nature of her injuries is
necessary. Unlike other victims of sexual offenses, the incest
victim is surrounded by a "conspiracy of silence. '23 The silence
has been fostered by society, which is not only unwilling to
believe that the family could create an unsafe environment for
children,24 but is also unwilling to believe the incest victim.
25
Incest victims are often ignored or accused of being at fault
when they have attempted to report incestuous abuse.26 The
silence is also maintained by the victim who is unable to over-
come the complex psychological and emotional barriers to
reporting incestuous abuse both at the time it occurs and later
in life.27
While the incest victim receives little or no assistance from
outside the family, she receives even less support from her
immediate family members when she attempts to disclose the
fact of incest.2" In most cases, the mother is unable to protect
her daughter because of the mother's own weak position in the
family, or unwillingness to protect her from anger or blame.29
22. Id. (quoting Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 665, 453 P.2d at 634.)
23. See generally S. BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST
(1978) (hereinafter BUTLER).
24. Eric Press, Holly Morris, Richard Sondza, An Epidemic of Incest, Newsweek,
Nov. 30, 1981, at 68. Other scholars suggest that if close relatives are included within
these figures, one woman in every six is a victim of sexual molestation within the
family. See generally HERMAN-LEWIS and HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 12.
The American Psychological Association, however, estimates that 12-15 million
American woman have been victims of incestuous abuse. Brozen, supra note 5 at 82.
25. See generally N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE
IN AMERICA (1976) (hereafter GAGER and SCHURR).
26. P. MRAZEK & C. KEMP, SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 227
(1981).
27. See generally HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5; D. FINKELHOR,
SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN (1979); Adams-Tucker, Proximate Effects of Sexual
Abuse in Childhood, 139 PSYCHIATRY 10 (1982) (hereinafter Adams-Tucker).
28. HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 78-79, 83, 89-90; SUMMIT, supra
note 5, at 137-138.
29. HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 132. Most incest occurs in
families where traditional sex roles are most emphasized. The father has an
unchallenged position as the authority figure and bread winner, while the mother
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The incest victim is most often a young child; the average
age is eight years. However, the age of incest victims ranges
from birth to sixteen.3" At such an early age the child is not
only unable to understand the significance or wrongfulness of
her father's conduct, she also has no power to effectively pro-
test against it.31 As a child she is vulnerable to her father's
power and control as the authority figure in the family.32 The
incestuous father persistently encourages sexual relations,
assuring his daughter that their relationship is normal, while
at the same time, insuring her silence about the relationship
through direct threats of harm to herself and the family or
through the daughter's own perceived fear of harm.33 Her
silence, in effect, is coerced.
Incest victims believe that the disclosure of the incestuous
relationship will break up the family, thus they feel that they
are responsible for holding the family together.' In addition,
the child fears that revealing the relationship to others will
encourage not only her father's anger, rejection, or physical
harm to herself, but perhaps even his imprisonment 35 or deser-
tion of the family.36 At the same time, she fears her mother's
anger 37 and her own punishment by law enforcement offi-
cials.3" Thus, from the daughter's point of view, her silence
will not only maintain the economic security of her family, but
will also insure her own safety from an even worse harm, the
dissolution of the family.
By maintaining her silence, however, the incest victim
only enhances her "distorted perception of herself as an
assumes domestic and childcare duties. Mothers in these families are often powerless
or passive within the family. They either cannot protect their daughters or will not
accept the truth of their husbands' incestuous conduct and thus put their own
marriage or economic well-being at risk. Id at 57, 63, 72, 74, 77-79, 83.
30. SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 127-150; HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5,
at 83.
31. Adams-Tucker, supra note 27, at 1252-1256.
32. HERMAN-LEwIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 88.
33. HERmAN-LEwIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 80, 83; Statutes of Limitations
in Civil Incest Suits, supra note 4, at 196.
34. HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 80, 83. One incest victim
stated: "My father told me that if I ever let anyone know what he had been doing
with me that the police would send him to jail. Living in my neighborhood, all of us
kids knew if daddy went there we would have to go on welfare and mom just wouldn't
have been able to keep things together." BUTLER, supra note 23, at 33.
35. BUTLER, supra note 23, at 32-34; SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 88, 163.
36. Statute of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits, supra note 4, at 197.
37. BUTLER, supra note 23, at 32, 34, 47.
38. Id.
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accomplice to her own exploitation. '39 Although terrified, con-
fused, and distraught, the incest victim feels that she herself
has created the problem and that she therefore deserves her
father's conduct.4 ° She feels guilt and shame, and she takes
the blame for her father's behavior. Her silence allows the
incestuous abuse to continue and, at the same time, prevents
her from getting any assurance from others that she is not
responsible for her father's behavior.
B. The Nature of the Injury
While some victims of incest learn to accommodate and
cope by maintaining silence and hiding the truth, experts have
observed that many incest victims, as in Tyson, repress the
memory of the incest in order to cope with repeated abuse.4 '
One expert has stated that "the very nature of the sexual
assault will likely make the victim incapable of recognizing the
relationship between her problems and the assault because the
only way she survived the assaults was to 'compartmentalize'
the period of assaults, pretend they were not happening, and
try to block the acts out of her memory."4 2
Blocking the memory of the abuse is a coping mechanism
that occurs because, as one psychologist states, "some things
are so difficult to deal with if remembered that your choices
are to go crazy or to forget them. '43 Many incest victims learn
to accommodate the repeated assaults, their awareness of the
wrongfulness of the molestation, and their feelings of responsi-
bility as a participant in the abuse. This accommodation
causes certain psychological processes in which the victim
blocks out the abusive experiences and maintains a facade of
normalcy."
39. Comment, supra note 10, at 197.
40. BUTLER, supra note 23, at 301.
41. SUMMIT, supra note 5, at 133-136. See generally BUTLER, supra note 23;
HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5.
There are many case histories of repression caused by incestuous abuse. See, e.g.,
BUTLER, supra note 23, at 48 (woman who, as a child, was a victim of incest, but had
repressed her memory of the experience until she had an adult sexual relationship);
GAGER, & SCHURR, supra note 25, at 9-10 (woman who of the assault until she entered
therapy after a failed marriage).
42. Affidavit of Lucy Berliner, p. 3, attached as Appendix A to Brief for Plaintiff,
Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226.
43. See generally Summit & Kryso, Sexual Abuse of Children, 48 AMERICAN
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 237 (1978).
44. Affidavit of Dr. Gayle Gulick Nelson, p. 4, Brief for Plaintiff, Tyson, 107 Wash.
2d 72, 727 P.2d 226.
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Coping mechanisms, such as repression, blocking, compart-
mentalization, denial, or even personality splitting,45 enable
the victim to survive by controlling thoughts and feelings to
the point at which there is no recognition of victimization.4"
These psychological coping mechanisms, however, also make it
difficult for the victim to recognize and discuss the incestuous
experiences.47 The adult victim often does not remember what
happened as a child, and injury is denied until recall of it is
triggered by therapy or other events.48 One psychologist has
stated:
It is common for these victims not to be able to recog-
nize the impact of the victimization during this period of
denial. Only after the victim acknowledges the abuse
45. Id.
46. The trauma of incest and its delayed effects is comparable to an illness known
as "combat neurosis" or Stress Response Syndrome experienced by war veterans and
those who have had acute traumatic experiences such as assault, rape, and accidents.
Most recently, this illness has come to the attention of mental health professionals
through Vietnam veterans. See, e.g., HOROWITZ & MARDI, STRESS RESPONSE
SYNDROME (1976).
The victim or survivor often experiences a period of numbness after the trauma
that at least temporarily allows the victim to appear to be well-adjusted and normal.
Usually denial and numbness alternate with sever psychic distress helping the victim
to avoid any confrontation with his/her guilt, shame, fear, pain or revulsion of the
trauma. Eventually a latent period of relief ensues and the victim feels as if effects of
the trauma have passed. See Figley & Sprenkle, Delayed Stress Response Syndrome,
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY COUNSELING 54 (July 1978); see also Speigel, Vietnam Grief
Work Using Hypnosis, 24 CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 33, 33-40 (1981).
Victims of trauma cope through repression, blocking, compartmentalization,
denial, splitting, and amnesia. They experience such symptoms as nightmares,
disassociation, psychosomatic disorders, alcohol and eating disorders, flashbacks,
disorientation, and depression. These symptoms can last as long as ten years. S.
HALEY, Treatment Implications of Past Traumatic Stress Response Syndrome for
Mental Health Professionals, in STRESS DISORDERS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS:
THEORY, RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 254-67 (1968).
47. For a discussion of the long-term effects of incestuous abuse, see generally
Steele & Alexander, Long-Term Effects of Sexual Abuse in Childhood, and The Effects
of Child Sexual Abuse: Methodological Considerations, in SEXUALLY ABUSED
CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1981); Statute of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits,
supra note 4, at 200-201; HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 98-108.
48. See Affidavit of Lucy Berliner, supra note 43, at 6. The plaintiff in Tyson
began therapy in 1980 because she was having difficulties in relationships with men. In
addition, she was depressed and expressed a low self-image and lack of trust. Her
psychiatrist suspected that she may have been a victim of incest, but when asked,
plaintiff denied this.
The plaintiff returned to therapy in 1982 after she began to have nightmares of
being raped and chased and was in a state of general anxiety and fearfulness for her
safety. She eventually joined a six-week counseling group for women who had been
victims of sexual abuse. It was at that time the plaintiff began to remember specific
events of the past alleged abuse by her father. Id.
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through disclosure or through entering therapy, do the
effects begin to be evidenced. The control over thoughts and
feelings gradually dissipates and the victim may become
severely depressed or suffer other psychological conse-
quences. It is often only at this point that the victim
becomes aware of the effects of the sexual assault.49
Studies have shown that the incest victim suffers psycho-
logical injuries that manifest immediately after the trauma and
continue into adulthood.5 0 The long-term effects include pros-
titution, running away from home,5 ' attempted suicide,5 2 mari-
tal problems and difficulty in establishing and maintaining
close relationships.5 3 In addition, incest victims may experi-
ence other problems including learning disabilities, psycho-
somatic symptoms, sexual dysfunction,' obesity, chronic
depression, neurosis, psychosis, schizophrenia and, in the
extreme, multiple personalities, 55 character disorders,' and
substance abuse.
The incest victim must overcome a variety of obstacles in
order to deal with the effects of the incestuous abuse. She not
only must convince society to listen, she must break the silence
imposed by her father, as well as by herself through her own
fears. Her inability to recognize and understand the harm
done to her, however, is only one of the barriers she must
overcome; another barrier is the legal one. While the blame-
less child victim of incest is virtually powerless to overcome
49. Id. at 4.
50. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Northwest Women's Law Center at 7, Tyson, 107
Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226.
51. Approximately one-half of all teenage runaways come from homes where they
were victims of incest. A higher percentage of teenage prostitutes are incest victims.
J. DENSEN-GERBER & J. BENWARD, INCEST AS A CAUSATIVE FACTOR IN ANTI-SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (1976); JAMES & MEYERDING, Early Sexual
Experience and Prostitution, 134 PSYCHOLOGY 1381-1385 (1977).
52. In one study conducted, almost 35% of incest victims had attempted suicide at
one time in their lives. See HERMAN-LEWIS & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 99.
53. Id. at 31-32.
54. Studies show that as many as 74% of incest victims have experienced orgasmic
dysfunction. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 31-32.
56. Affadavit of Dr. Gayle Gulick Nelson, supra note 45, at 6. Repeated sexual
assault retards healthy ego development and denies a child a sense of self-worth. A
negative self-image in turn makes it difficult for the incest victim to maintain normal
interpersonal relationships.
57. One study conducted in a residential theraputic community for drug users
found that 44% of the women who took part in the study had been incest victims.
DENSEN-GERBER & BENWARD, supra note 52, at 323-40.
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the psychological effects of incest, the victim who has done so
and then seeks compensation through the legal system will be
thwarted by the statute of limitations."8
IV. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Background
Statutes of limitation are legislative determinations that
mandate that after the lapse of a specific period of time a claim
will not be enforceable in court. 9 All defendants are entitled
to assert the statute of limitations as a complete defense to an
action brought after the period has lapsed. This is a constitu-
tional guarantee of due process. °
When the legislature determines time limits on the asser-
tion of certain rights, after the requisite time has passed, one
party is deprived of the opportunity of raising an otherwise
valid claim.6 United States Supreme Court Justice Jackson
stated that "statutes of limitations find their justification in
necessity and convenience rather than logic .... They are by
definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate
between the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and the
unavoidable delay .... They represent a public policy about
the privilege to litigate. '62
The nature of the cause of action determines the applica-
ble statute of limitation, and the statute of limitation is not
operative until there is a cause of action to which it may be
applied.63 The cause of action accrues when the person has the
right to gain access to the courts for relief. Usually the limita-
tion period is construed literally so that the date of accrual or
58. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, Nos. 82-1101, 82-1403 consolidated (10th Cir. March 21,
1982) cert denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983) (affirmed decisions of the District Court for the
District of New Mexico, granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on
grounds the plaintiff's cause of action in first suit based on assault, battery and outrage
was barred by the statute of limitations, and granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground of res judicata in the second suit); Newlander, supra note 4,
(sustaining demurrer to the complaint based on the statute of limitations).
59. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1179 (1950) (hereinafter Developments).
60. 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 4, at 593 (1970).
61. Developments, supra note 60, at 1185.
62. Chase Security Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
63. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.020 (1987) (the statute of limitations for
actions for recovery or possession of real property is ten years); WAH. REV. CODE
§ 4.16.070 (1987) (the statute of limitations for actions by or against executors is five
years); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080 (1986) (the statute of limitations for actions for
relief based on fraud is three years).
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"date of injury" is that of the wrongful act or omission which is
the basis of the claim.'
In Washington, a tort personal injury claim has a limita-
tion period of three years, while assault and battery has a limi-
tation period of two years.65  Traditional tort cases fit neatly
into the statutory period because in most instances when the
act or omission occurs, the injured party is aware of the injury
and has the ability to seek relief within the courts. An under-
lying premise of the statute of limitations is that "when an
adult person has a justiciable grievance, he usually knows it
and the law affords him ample opportunity to assert it in the
courts.'
66
One exception to a strict construction of the statute of lim-
itations that offers a plaintiff a more flexible time period in
which to bring suit is the exception for disabilities.67 The disa-
bility period excepts plaintiffs who are subject to some legal
disability such as infancy, incompetency, or imprisonment,
from a strict reading of the statute of limitation. The period of
limitations commences when the disability ceases.6"
The Washington Supreme Court has noted that: "as a mat-
ter of basic justice, the courts usually have a cogent reason to
give limitations statutes a literal and rigid reading...; 6 9 and
that:
64. See generally Linquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 676, 277 P.2d 722, 724 (1954)
(in malpractice case, the cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful act that
caused the injury).
65. "Within three years: An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal
property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury
to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated." WASH. REV. CODE §
4.16.080(2) (1985). "Within two years: An action for libel, slander, assault, assault and
battery, or false imprisonment." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.100(1) (1985).
66. See Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 665, 453 P.2d at 634 (in medical malpractice case
where foreign substance or article was left in surgical wound, statute of limitations
began to run when patient discovers or should have discovered presence of the
substance or article).
67. If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, except
for a penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer, for an escape,
be at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of eighteen
years, or incompetent or disabled to such a degree that he or she cannot
understand the nature of the proceedings, such incompetency as disability as
determined according to Chapter 11.88 WASH. REV. CODE or imprisoned on a
criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a court for a term less
than his natural life, the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time
limited for the commencement of action.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.190 (1987).
68. The disability must exist at the time the cause of action accrues.
69. Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 665, 453 P.2d at 634.
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[t]here is nothing inherently unjust about a statute of limita-
tions .... No civilized society could lay claim to an enlight-
ened judicial system which puts no limits on the time in
which a person can be compelled to defend against claims
brought in good faith, much less whatever stale, illusory,
false, fraudulent or malicious accusations of civil wrong
might be leveled against him.70
B. False or Stale Claims
The underlying policy reasons for statutes of limitations
are to promote the assertion of valid claims, to promote repose
by offering stability and security to human activity, and to pro-
mote the harmony and welfare of society to compel a quick
settlement of claims.71 The court in Tyson is most concerned
with the assertion of false or stale claims against potential
defendants.
The concern for false claims in incest abuse cases should
be no more than in other cases. The literature suggests that if
the risk of false claims exists at all, it would more likely be
before the age of twenty or twenty-one, when the incest victim
is still a young woman involved in family power struggles and
rebellion.v2
With regard to stale claims, the court in Tyson states that
stale claims tend to be suspect, for they are based on old evi-
dence. Parties must, therefore, defend against faded memories
of witnesses who can no longer accurately describe events that
have taken place.7 3 In time, witnesses disappear or die, and
complaints fade away or grow to extreme proportions.7 4 The
Washington Supreme Court has stated that while it is the goal
of common law to provide a legal remedy for each valid griev-
ance, "it is also a traditional view that compelling one to
answer stale claims in the courts is in itself a substantial
wrong. ' 75
70. I& at 664, 453 P.2d at 634.
71. See 51 AM. JuR. 2D, supra note 61, at 602.
72. Paper by Briere, "The Effects of Childhood Abuse on Later Psychological
Functions: Defining Post-Sexual Abuse Syndrome," Third National Conference on
Sexual Victimization of Children (Washington, D.C. April 1984)).
73. See 51 AM. JuR. 2D, supra note 61, at 602.
74. Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 665, 453 P.2d at 634.
75. Id. The traditional view of the court was that "it is better for the public thatsome rights be lost than that stale litigation be permitted." See generally Thomas v.Richter, 88 Wash. 451, 153 P. 333 (1915) (in an action against a trustee of a corporation
to recover for creditors the amount of an unlawful diminution of the capital stock, thecause of action is barred three years after date of unlawful reduction and is not
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Even if the incest victim brings her claim after her age dis-
ability disappears and within the statutory period, the court in
most cases would have to deal with old evidence. As the dis-
sent in Tyson notes, the acts complained of allegedly occurred
from the time plaintiff was three years old until she reached
the age of eleven. Even if the plaintiff had filed suit within the
statutory period, the evidence in her case would be at least ten
years old.76 The plaintiff in Tyson filed her suit at age twenty-
six. The court's concern for stale claims is not logically less-
ened in a period of five years. Evidence that is fifteen years
old, rather than ten, is not "so much less 'verifiable' that it
warrants the harsh result of foreclosing a potentially meritori-
ous claim."
77
The defendant in an incest suit does not come to court
unprotected. Even without the existence of the statute of limi-
tations in such cases, the legal system carefully protects the
rights of defendants. The rules of evidence and trial proce-
dures are designed to thwart false claims. Discovery, cross-
examination and confrontation of witnesses effectively guard
the rights of litigants against stale evidence. The jury hearing
the witnesses will decide whether the plaintiff or defendant is
to be believed. Just as the risk of an erroneous criminal con-
viction does not stop criminal prosecutions, the mere possibil-
ity that the trier of fact will believe a false or stale claim
should not prevent the litigation of incestuous abuse cases.
V. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
A. Physical Evidence
While the Tyson court's concern for false or stale claims is
exaggerated, its requirement of verifiable, objective evidence is
unwarranted. Even in cases of criminal prosecution for sexual
abuse in which the standard of proof is higher than in civil
cases, the existence of physical evidence of the criminal act is
extended to three years after insolvency of corporation and discovery of the fraud);
Cornell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P. 602 (1914) (where attorney wrongfully dismissed
plaintiff's action without consent and deceived plaintiff into believing action had been
adversely decided, running of statute of limitations began at time of wrongful
dismissal); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265 (1930) (action against
attorney for malpractice or breach of duty in allowing client to lose his legacy by
witnessing a will in his favor, is based on breach of contract and governed by three-
year statute of limitations).
76. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 84, 727 P.2d at 232 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
77. 1& at 85, 727 P.2d at 232 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
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rare. 78
In Washington, sexual abuse can be characterized as
8 1 82incest,79 indecent liberties,s° rape, or statutory rape. 2 Incest
and indecent liberties do not require proof of sexual inter-
course. For these crimes "sexual contact" is sufficient. Sexual
contact means any touching of the sexual or intimate parts of a
person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of
either party.83 Touching is clearly unverifiable except through
the testimony of witnesses. Most often the only witness is the
child victim, whose fragile word is the only evidence the prose-
cutor has against the defendant.' Implicit within the Tyson
court's reasoning is the suggestion that even cases of criminal
sexual offenses, clearly within the statute of limitations,
should be precluded in Washington because of the lack of evi-
dence that would force the decision of a case to rest on the
credibility of the witnesses.8 5
As the dissent in Tyson points out, actions which essen-
tially turn on the credibility of witnesses are not unique.86 In
fact, it is often the strategy of counsel to impeach the credibil-
ity of opposing witnesses through the presentation of prior
inconsistent statements, bias, character evidence, or defects in
sensory or mental capacity. 7 Whether plaintiff's case would
turn on the credibility of the parties, however, should not even
be the court's concern. In a case such as Tyson, the issue of
credibility is one that would rest solely within the province of
the trier of fact.
Contrary to the court's assertion in Tyson, the verification
of incestuous abuse is, in fact, possible through the use of diag-
78. Bailey, Grueling Child-Abuse Cases Push Many Prosecutors to Their Limits,
Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 24, col. 3.
79. See supra note 6.
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.100 (1985).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040 (1985).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.070 (1985).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.100(2) (1985).
84. Bailey, supra note 78. The author states that in King County, Washington in
1985, prosecutors won only about 60% of the child molestation cases brought to trial,
compared with conviction rates of 80% to 90% for other felony cases. District
attorneys nationwide have stated that no other crime is more difficult to try. Id.
85. For a discussion of children as witnesses in abuse cases, see generally Note, Are
Children Competent Witnesses?: A Psychological Perspective, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 815
(1985); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1985); Berliner and Barbieri, The
Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 125 (1984).
86. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 83, 727 P.2d at 231.
87. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 333-47 (3rd ed. 1984).
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nostic tools such as observation of behavior and symptoms. 8 8
Psychiatrists and psychologists who treat incest victims can
give testimony that can be supported by other circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of family, friends, teachers, and others
will most likely reveal the observations of those symptoms
identified with sexual abuse.89 The verification of the damage
to the incest victim over time is a crucial factor. Long-term
psychological effects can and must be observed over a signifi-
cant period of time.
B. Psychological versus Physical Injury
Because the injury to the incest victim is more psychologi-
cal than physical, the court in Tyson has emphasized its con-
cerns about evidence and proof. Similar concerns were
expressed by the legal community with the recognition of
psychic injury in tort claims. One court found this fear to be
insufficient to deny recovery:
To forbid all such actions because groundless charges
may be made is not a good reason for denying recovery.
That some claims may be spurious should not compel those
who administer justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs
and let them go without being brought to account. It is the
function of the courts and juries to determine whether
claims are valid or false, a responsibility which should not be
shunned merely because the task may be difficult to
perform.90
In response to the growing recognition of the debilitating
effects of emotional distress and a better understanding of
human psychology, courts have sought to protect the individ-
ual's interest in mental and emotional tranquility. 91 For
almost a century, Washington courts have allowed recovery of
damages for mental distress without physical impact when the
88. Briere, supra note 73.
89. Id.
90. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (recovery allowed for
emotional distress caused by invitation to elicit intercourse and indecent exposure),
cited in Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B. U. L. REV. 584, 591 (1961).
91. See generally Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Formulating the Psycho-Legal Inquiry, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 401 (1984); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971); Amdursky, The Interest in
Mental Tranquility, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 339 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 306 (1965); Rendall, Nervous Shock and Tortious Liability, 2 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 291
(1962).
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defendant's action was willful or intentional.92
The Washington court, like other courts nationwide, at
first struggled with the problem of defining the boundaries of
liability for mental distress injuries where the issue was negli-
gently caused mental or emotional distress resulting in physi-
cal injury, without impact to the person. In early cases, in
which a defendant's acts were negligent and there was no
impact to the plaintiff, the Washington Supreme Court initially
adopted the then prevelant rule of not allowing recovery for
mental distress.93
The Washington court began its departure from the so-
called impact rule by allowing recovery for negligently caused
mental distress that resulted in physical injury.94 The depar-
ture from the impact rule was further refined by allowing
recovery for negligently caused mental distress that resulted in
a threat of an immediate physical invasion of the plaintiff's
personal security.95 This rationale constituted the adoption of
a zone of danger theory of recovery, rather than actual physi-
cal impact: "[G]enerally, in cases which do not involve malice
or intent to do harm, there must be either an immediate physi-
cal invasion of the plaintiff's person or security, or a direct
possibility of such an invasion in order that recovery may be
had for mental anguish or distress of mind."9
In a more recent case, in which the Washington Supreme
Court reexamined the issue of liability for the negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress, the court stated:
In the main, the reasons advanced by the court for deny-
ing recovery, i.e., each of precedent, increased litigation,
remoteness, and fear of fictitious and feigned claims, have
92. See Willson v. Northern Pac. R.R., 5 Wash. 621, 32 P. 468, 34 P. 146 (1893);
Davis v. Tacoma R. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904); McClure v. Campbell,
42 Wash. 252, 84 P. 825 (1906); Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 P. 172 (1907);
Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 P. 436 (1913); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash.
134, 233 P. 299 (1925).
93. See Corcoran v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 80 Wash. 570, 142 P. 29 (1914);
Kneass v. Cremation Society of Washington, 103 Wash. 21, 175 P. 172 (1918); Barnes v.
Bickle, 111 Wash. 133, 189 P. 998 (1920); Stiles v. Pantages Theatre Co., 152 Wash. 626,
279 P. 112 (1929).
94. See O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550 (1916) (defendant's blasting of
stumps caused dislodged stump to be hurled into plaintiff's house; in effort to protect
herself and escape danger, plaintiff sustained physical injuries).
95. See Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935)
(pregnant plaintiff observed runaway truck approaching her home, feared safety of
young son in yard and suffered miscarriage).
96. Murphy v. Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d 603, 620-21, 374 P.2d 976, 987-88 (1962).
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now been generally discarded. The old rationales are simply
no longer viable.
97
Our experience tells us that mental distress is a fact of
life. With adequate limitations, the court can administer the
adjudication of this tort just as it does the complex intrica-
cies of products liability and medical malpractice.
98
Eventually the courts accepted recovery for pure psycho-
logical injury. Virtually all jurisdictions in the United States
now recognize the intentional tort of "outrage," i.e., the inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm. The Washington Supreme
Court adopted the tort of outrage in Grimsby v. Samson.9 9 The
tort of outrage allows recovery for mental distress without the
necessity of resulting physical harm. The Washington court
established the following elements of outrage: (1) the emo-
tional distress must be inflicted intentionally or recklessly, not
negligently; (2) the conduct of the defendant must be outra-
geous and extreme to be regarded as intolerable in a civilized
community; (3) the conduct must result in severe emotional
distress to the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff must be an imme-
diate family member of the person who is the object of the
defendant's conduct, and the plaintiff must be present at the
time of the conduct.1'°
The Washington courts have defined "outrage" in a variety
of circumstances, including severe emotional distress resulting
from abusive racist conduct of the defendant's employees,' 0 '
and severe emotional distress resulting from defendant sellers'
refusal to vacate premises upon an agreed date, preventing
plaintiff purchasers from taking possession and moving in even
after the house was vacant. 0 2
With regard to the concern for fraudulent claims and the
potential unlimited liability for every type of mental distur-
97. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 433, 553 P.2d 1096, 1101-02 (1976) (plaintiff's
home struck by car outside of plaintiff's immediate presence and without impact to
her, brought action to recover for heart damage resulting from negligently inflicted
emotional distress). The court in Hunsley noted that this case did not involve only
mental distress and that liability for emotional distress not manifested by physical
symptoms must be determined in another case. Id. at 433, 553 P.2d at 1102.
98. Id. at 435, 553 P.2d at 1103.
99. 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975) (plaintiff, husband of decedent, filed a
claim for damages based on the tort of outrage for death of wife, for hospital's alleged
negligent, reckless, and wanton breach of duty to provide medical care despite
plaintiff's requests).
100. Id. at 59-60, 530 P.2d at 295.
101. Conteras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
102. Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wash. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (1981).
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bance, the Washington Supreme Court in Grimsby stated that
"the fact that there may be greater opportunity for fraud or
collusion in one class of cases than another does not warrant
courts of law in closing the door to all cases of that class."10 3
In addition, the court, not willing to disparage the judicial sys-
tem, remarked that acceptance of the argument of possible
fraud "presupposes that courts are so ineffectual and the jury
system is so imperfect that fraudulent claims cannot be distin-
guished from the legitimate.' 10 4
While the court in Tyson does not propose the dissembling
of the tort of outrage in Washington, it has cast a wary eye
towards the well-established legal recognition of psychic injury
in Washington. The majority is not only concerned with psy-
chological injuries, but also, as the dissent notes, with the"mental health professionals' contribution to our justice
system."'05
VI. THE DISCOVERY OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
A. The Psychotherapist's Role
The majority in Tyson questions the reliability of the
mental health professional's testimony given to assist the jury
in ascertaining the truth and suggests that no action should be
brought at all if such testimony is necessary. The majority's
assumption of unreliability of expert testimony misconstrues
the role of the mental health professional in the application of
the discovery rule.
In any case involving the use of the discovery rule, the
court will decide whether the rule may be applied as a matter
of law. If the rule does apply, the trier of fact then determines
whether the plaintiff was diligent, i.e., whether the plaintiff
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the cause of
action.0 6
The role of the psychotherapist in such a case is minimal.
It is merely to help the jury to determine the time of discovery
of the cause of action. The Washington Supreme Court, in
prior cases in which the discovery rule has been applied, has
recognized that in some cases a "triggering event" is necessary
103. Grimsby, 85 Wash. 2d at 58, 530 P.2d at 295 (quoting Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d 642, 653-54, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952)).
104. I& (quoting Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 945 (1961)).
105. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 85, 727 P.2d at 232 (Pearson., J., dissenting).
106. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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to put the uninformed plaintiff on notice that she may have a
cause of action against a defendant.0 7
In Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co.,'0 8 plaintiff, a commercial
fisherman, sought to recover damages for loss of nets and other
fishing gear from his insurance agent for the agent's alleged
tortious cancellation of an insurance policy covering the gear.
The plaintiff obtained an "inland marine floater policy," which
provided insurance coverage for his gear both on his boat and
in storage. The plaintiff's father, also a fisherman, had a "web
house" policy from the same insurance company, which
insured his gear in storage. When plaintiff's father died, the
father's policy was endorsed over to plaintiff's mother and
renewed for three years. When this policy expired, the insur-
ance agent issued the plaintiff a renewal policy. The plaintiff's
own "floater" policy was renewed for three years. 0 9
When plaintiff filed a claim for lost gear after his boat
sank, he learned that his "floater" policy had been canceled in
the previous year without his authority. The still existing
"web" policy did not cover his loss on his boat. The filing of
his claim triggered awareness that he had a cause of action
against the insurance company for the value of his lost equip-
ment. The court held that plaintiff's cause of action accrued
when he first suffered actual loss and had an opportunity to
discover that he had an actionable claim for the unauthorized
cancellation of his policy.110
In Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital,"' the plaintiff knew
from an early age that "too much oxygen" administered in an
incubator during her first few days of life had caused her
blindness. She had always believed that the oxygen had been a
necessary treatment, had been administered correctly and that
her blindness was a complication of having been born prema-
turely. At the age of twenty-one, the plaintiff heard through
the news media that a friend of hers, who was also blind, had
filed a lawsuit claiming that her blindness had been caused by
the wrongful conduct of the hospital and the manufacturer of
the incubator. The plaintiff claimed it was then that she dis-
covered that her blindness could have been prevented and the
amount of oxygen administered had been incorrect.
107. See infra note 179.
108. 86 Wash. 2d 215, 543 P.2d 338 (1975).
109. Id. at 216-17, 543 P.2d at 340.
110. Id. at 223, 543 P.2d at 343.
111. 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
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The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that the
plaintiff knew of the oxygen and the resultant blindness.
However, the court refused to hold as a matter of law that
"knowledge received at age four imparts to that child a realiza-
tion that administration of 'too much oxygen' did or may have
constituted a breach of duty.""' 2 Even though the plaintiff
knew of the injury caused by the oxygen, the court held that
the plaintiff's claim did not accrue until she discovered or rea-
sonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of
her possible cause of action.113 The news report heard by
plaintiff triggered her discovery of the cause of action.
In a more recent case, Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.,"4 the Washington Supreme Court applied the discovery
rule where the plaintiff's discovery of his cause of action was
triggered by consultation with a lawyer. The plaintiff had
worked with asbestos products from 1939 to 1978. In 1970 he
found out that he was suffering from asbestosis and he knew
that exposure to asbestos products had caused his illness. He
was aware of the manufacturers of the products with which he
worked, but it was not until he sought legal counsel in 1980
that he discovered that the asbestos manufacturers may have
committed wrongful acts, acted negligently, breached a legal
duty, or that he might even have a claim for damages." 5
In these cases, neither the filing of an insurance claim, the
news report, nor the consultation with the attorney proved the
truth of the plaintiffs' claims of negligence. These events
merely gave the plaintiffs notice of a potential cause of action.
The testimony of a psychotherapist treating an incest victim
purports to do no more than this-to document the time of the
victim's awareness or discovery of alleged injury, not the truth
of the victim's allegations.
The court in Tyson was certified to consider only the issue
of the application of the discovery rule. It was not certified to
judge the merits of the plaintiff's case. The majority's mis-
placed concern for the unreliability of psychological treatment
and testimony put the plaintiff in Tyson on trial. The court's
role was a limited one; it was not, however, to make a decision
on the facts of the case.
112. Id. at 510-11, 598 P.2d at 1360.
113. I& at 511, 598 P.2d at 1360.
114. 99 Wash. 2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983).
115. Id. at 551, 663 P.2d 474 (1983).
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VII. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW
A. The Role of Psychology in the Legal System
The problem of using mental health professionals as
expert witnesses is an issue outside of the confines of the
Tyson decision. The court in Tyson was certified to rule only
on whether the discovery rule could be applied as a matter of
law in cases of incest abuse where the victim represses mem-
ory. The court's open distrust, however, of mental health pro-
fessionals and their role in the legal system so overwhelms the
Tyson decision that this concern must be addressed.
Although the majority in Tyson is uncomfortable with the
role of mental health professionals in the legal system, it is an
undisputed reality that psychology permeates virtually every
aspect of our legal system.'16 Litigators have long recognized
the value of psychology as a tool for courtroom technique,117
especially in the selection and understanding of the dynamics
of juries.1 ' Psychological assessments of individuals have been
used extensively in family law," 9 particularly in custody
cases,120 as well as in tort law.' 2 ' Psychological assessment by
116. See generally Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of
the Art," 22 J. FAM. L. 445 (1984); LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the
Courtroom: Attorney Beware, 8 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 83 (1984); Introduction to
this Issue: Psychology of the Courtroom, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 361, 422 (1984); Cox,
The Contribution of Dynamic Psychotherapy to Forensic Psychiatry and Vice Versa, 6
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 89 (1983); Ziegenfuss & Ziegenfuss, Psycholegal Assessmen
Diagnosis, and Testimony: A Bibliography, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 503 (1982).
117. See generally Call, Psychology in Litigation, 21 TRIAL 48 (March 1985);
Rothblatt, Psychological Techniques of Persuasion in the Trial Process, 11 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 755 (1984); Vinson, Litigation: An Introduction to the Application of Behavorial
Science, 15 CONN. L. REV. 767 (1983).
118. See generally Less-Haley, Psychology of Jury Selection, 28 RES GESTAE 650
(1985); Less-Haley, The Psychology of Jury Selection, 47 TEX. B.J. 918 (1984); Saks &
Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony: Surveys of the Law and
of Jurors, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 435 (1984); Deitz & Sissman, Investigating Jury
Bias in a Child Molestation Case, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 423-34 (1984); Goldman,
Freundlich, & Casey, Jury Emotional Responses and Deliveration Style, 11 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 319 (1983).
119. See generally Wittmann, Child Advocacy and the Scientific Model in Family
Court: A Theory for Pre-Trial Assessment, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 61 (1985); Dunne,
Psychological Processes of Divorce, 39 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 14 (1985).
120. See generally Warshak, Father-Custody and Child Development: A Review
and Analysis of Psychological Research, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 185 (1986); Waters,
Psychiatric Considerations in Preserving the Best Interests of the Child, 8 U.N.S.W. L.
J. 137 (1985).
121. See generally Blinder, Psychiatric Analysis in Personal Injury Cases, 22
TRIAL 75 (1986); Psychology of the Courtroom. Emotional Distress in Tort Law, 3
BEHAVORIAL SCI. & L. 121 (1985); Mendelson, Followup Studies of Personal Injury
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mental health professionals, psychologists, and psychiatrists
provide the basis for involuntary civil commitments in Wash-
ington State.122 The role of psychology in criminal law has
been most profound, ranging from criminal procedure and the
use of pretrial assessment and post-trial treatment 123 to the
discussion of the right to psychiatric care of prisoners, 124 and to
the enactment of legislation. 25 Statutes in Washington allow
psychological evaluation and assessment to be used in the
determination of imposing the death penalty.126
Considering just the area of sex offenses and sexual abuse,
within the past half century, psychiatrists, psychologists, and
social workers have not only influenced society's response to
this social problem, but their expertise has also guided legisla-
tures in formulating policy.'27 Mental health professionals
have played a significant role in the development of legal pol-
icy, including defining and redefining criminal behavior. This
participation by mental health professionals has led to the
enactment of statutes governing such behavior. 28  Their role
has been comparable to that of physicians who have aided in
Litigants, 7 INT'L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 179 (1984); Sersland, Mental Disability Caused
by Mental Stress: Standards of Proof in Workers' Compensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L.
REV. 751 (1983); Whittington, The Role of the Psychiatrist in Personal Injury
Litigation, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 419 (1982).
122. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05. (1985) for the process of evaluation
and detention of persons defined as mentally disordered.
123. See generally Weisberg, The 'Discovery' of Sexual Abuse: Experts' Role in
Legal Policy Formulation, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1984) (hereinafter Weisberg,
Discovery of Sexual Abuse).
124. See generally Brenner & Galanti, Prisoners' Rights to Psychiatric Care, 21
IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1985).
125. See generally Weisberg, The Discovery of Sexual Abuse, supra note 123. For
discussion of the role of psychology in mental health legislation, see generally Schmidt,
Critique of the American Psychiatric Association's Guidelines for State Legislation on
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 11 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
11-43 (1985); Beran & Hotz, A Study of the Civil Commitment of Mentally Disordered
Criminals, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 257 (1984); Applebaum, Standards for Civil
Commitment: A Critical Review of Empirical Research, 7 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
133 (1984); Hamilton, Observations on the Mental Health Act of 1983, 6 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 371 (1983).
126. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.060(4), .070(2), .070(5), .070(6), .070(8), .080,
.100, .120(1)(f)-(g), .120(2) (c), .120(3) (c).
127. See generally Weisberg, supra note 123.
128. For a discussion of the role of physicians in this process, see Pfohl, The
'Discovery' of Child Abuse, 24 Soc. PROB. 310 (1977). The author suggests that the
discovery of physical abuse by radiologists could come about because, although
radiology as a field enjoyed a marginal medical status, there was an opportunity to
advance and to work with the more accepted and prestigious segments of the medical
profession. Id. at 320.
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the identification of the social problem of the battered child
and in shaping subsequent legislation.129
B. Expert Testimony
Until the 1920's, the psychiatrist's influence in the court-
room was limited to assessment for insanity pleas.1 30 During
the 1920's, however, their influence grew to include the presen-
tation of expert testimony regarding criminal behavior.1
3 '
Today, expert testimony by mental health professionals is a
well-recognized part of the American legal system. The Tyson
court's implication that Washington should abandon the use of
such testimony suggests, as the dissent so succinctly states, that
the Washington Supreme Court "disinvent the wheel."'32
The Washington courts and courts of other jurisdictions
have recognized the value and necessity of mental health pro-
fessionals' expert testimony. As with most testimony, the trial
court has discretionary control of psychiatric testimony used to
aid the jury. Washington courts follow Evidence Rule 702,
which governs the admissibility of expert testimony.133 The
admissibility of such testimony depends on whether (1) the
witness qualifies as an expert, (2) the opinion is based upon an
explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity, and (3) the expert testimony would be helpful to the trier
of fact."3 The final determination of either a plaintiff's or
defendant's mental state rests with the jury who decide the
129. The first case in Washington concerning the 'battered child syndrome" was
State v. Muldar, 29 Wash. App. 513, 629 P.2d 462 (1981). The court accepted that the
"battered child syndrome" has become a well-recognized medical diagnosis from which
the physician draws an inference of non-accidental injury to the child. Id. at 15, 629
P.2d at 463. In Muldar, the court held that the use of 'battered child syndrome" to
describe the cause of a child's injury of death does not neccesarily indicate wrongdoing
on the part of the defendant. Evidence must still be produced to show that the
defendant caused the injury and the trier of fact must decide what weight to give the
expert's testimony. Id. at 515, 629 P.2d at 463.
For a discussion of the "battered child syndrome" see generally Annotation,
Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony on Battered Child Syndrome, 98 A.L.R. 3d
306 (1980); Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegmueller & Silver, The Battered Child
Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. A. 17 (1962).
130. Weisberg, supra note 124, at 16.
131. Id.
132. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 87, 727 P.2d at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983)).
133. Wash. Ct. ER 702.
134. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596, 692 P.2d 312, 315 (1984).
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probative weight of the expert testimony.3
The Washington courts and other state courts and circuit
courts have admitted the testimony of mental health profes-
sionals on a variety of psychological conditions including
delayed stress syndrome, or stress response syndrome 136 (to
which the trauma of incest is comparable), rape trauma syn-
drome,137 and battered woman syndrome. 38  The courts accept
135. State v. Skinner, 1 Wash. App. 493, 463 P.2d 193 (1969) (determination of
defendant's mental capacity at the time of crime rests with the jury).
136. In United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1984), the court admitted
expert testimony regarding both post-traumatic stress disorder and forced prostitution
in a case involving kidnapping and transporting women in interstate commerce for
immoral purposes. During the trial, the defendant pointed out that the two alleged
victims failed to take advantage of an opportunity to escape, thus they voluntarily
consented to sexual activity that took place. I at 605.
The court held that the subject matter of the testimony, the effect of post-
traumatic stress disorder, which causes a loss of ego-strength and self-confidence to
accept the domination of another, was beyond the common knowledge of the average
layman and would assist the jury to understand the evidence. Id.
See also Pope v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 703 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983)
(psychiatric testimony allowed to show plaintiff suffered from chronic post-traumatic
stress disorder as a result of her involvement in life-threatening situation of burglary
in progress). See also supra note 47.
137. See State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Hawaii 1982) (expert testimony on rape
trauma involving specific characteristics observed and shared among children raped by
family members admissible for impeachment of witness credibility); State v.
Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) (testimony of qualified expert on whether
reaction of one child is similar to reaction of most victims of familial child abuse will
assist jury in deciding whether rape occurred); State v. Harwoed, 45 Or. App. 931, 609
P.2d 1312 (1980) (expert testimony that it was not uncommon for sexually abused
children to perceive and remember sexual encounters as occurring during sleep was
helpful to jury and did not constitute improper expert comment on evidence, and was
thus admissible in prosecution of first-degree rape); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411,
587 P.2d 1044 (1978) (not abuse of discretion to permit "Rape Victim Advocate" to
testify that victim's emotional state was similar to reactions of most sexual abuse
victims who came to hospital); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918 (Mont. 1984) (in
prosecution for sexual intercourse without consent, expert testimony regarding
presence of rape-trauma syndrome was admissible to assist jury in resolving whether
or not there was consent); State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982) (in prosecution for
rape and aggravated sodomy in which defendant raised defense of consent, expert
testimony that victim has been suffering from rape trauma syndrome was relevant and
did not invade province of jury). See generally Massary, Experts, Psychology,
Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and its Implications for
Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 470 (1985).
138. The Washington courts recognized the battered woman syndrome as an issue
in self-defense in State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). The battered
woman syndrome includes the behavioral characteristics of frustration, stress
disorders, depression, economic and emotional dependency on husband, hopes that the
marital relationship will improve, poor self-image, isolation caused from a loss of
contact with friends and family, and learned helplessness which results from the fear
and unpredictability of batterings that lead to a feeling of surrender and failure to
realize or know there are options to escape the relationship with the batterer. See
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such testimony as an invaluable aid to a lay jury, uninformed
as to the complexities of psychological injury.
The majority in Tyson echoes the current general concern
about the legitimacy of psychiatric authority. 139 It is not this
author's purpose to be an apologist for the shortcomings of psy-
chology. The majority's assertion, however, that the biological
or "pure" sciences are less subjective in their methods of inves-
tigation is simply naive.
All scientists come to an experiment with prejudices, as
well as an initial predisposition to prove or disprove a theory
or claim that is the impetus of the experiment. One well-
known and respected biologist has noted that it is a "myth that
science itself is an objective enterprise, done properly only
when scientists can shuck the constraints of their culture and
view the world as it really is."' 4 ° The naive faith that these
factors do not introduce subjectivity into biological investiga-
tion is not borne out by the facts:
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activ-
ity. It progresses by hunch, vision and intuition. Much of its
change through time does not record a closer approach to
absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that
influence it so strongly. Facts are not pure and unsullied
lists of information; culture also influences what we see and
how we see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable induc-
tions from facts. The most creative theories are imaginative
visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also
strongly cultural. 4 '
The majority in Tyson rests its disapproval of psychologi-
generally Cross, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to Use of the Battered
Wife Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VANDERBILT L. REV. 741 (1982); Comment, The
Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary
Analysis, 77 N.W. U. L. REV. 348 (1982); Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill
or To be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 895 (1981).
See also State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984) (in prosecution for
second-degree murder, expert testimony was admissible to assist jury in evaluating
defendant's actions in light of her subjective impressions and reasonableness of her
apprehension of imminent death or bodily harm).
139. Psychiatric testimony has come under increasing attack in the last decade.
See also Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 174 (1985);
Camper & Loftus, The Role of Psychologists as Expert Witnesses in the Courtroom: No
More Daniels in the Lions' Den, 9 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 1, 13 (1985); see generally
Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L.
REV. 539 (1979).
140. J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21 (1981).
141. Id.
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cal interpretation on one commentator's questioning of the
validity of psychological analysis in light of possible variables
introduced by the psychiatrist. 142 The same questioning of
variables can be made for other scientific analyses. The scien-
tist's interpretations are always altered by the choice and
number of variables used and his or her predisposition and
expectations. In order to counteract the prejudicial effect of
any expert testimony, whether a biological or psychological
science, the legal system requires that the expert establish his
or her expertise and that the jury decide the weight of the
given testimony in its deliberations. 4 3
VIII. THE DISCOVERY RULE
A. Background
The Tyson decision forecloses the use of the discovery rule
for victims of incestuous abuse who have repressed memory of
the abuse. One legal scholar has noted that "as between the
duly diligent plaintiff and the wrongdoer, the courts have been
unnecessarily sympathetic towards the latter"' 44 by depriving
plaintiffs of any practical remedy, especially in cases in which
the plaintiff could not know of the injury at the time of the
wrongdoer's act or omission. Various courts have tolled the
statute of limitations so that the cause of action accrues not
from the date of injury, but instead from the date of
discovery.
1 45
In consideration of fundamental fairness and justice, and
the common law purpose of providing a remedy for grievances,
the Washington courts have, as have other courts, in certain
142. See generally Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert
Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REV. 331 (1985).
143. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 596, 682 P.2d at 315.
144. Developments, supra note 60, at 1205.
145. As of 1982, thirty-six jurisdictions have adopted the discovery rule either by
statute or judicial determination. See Note, Denial of a Remedy: Former Residents of
Hazardous Waste Sites and New York's Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J. ENVITL. L.
161, 170 n.5 (1982).
However, some jurisdictions have recently replaced their discovery rules with"statutes of repose," which lengthen the limitations time period to twelve years withthe commencement at the time the injury occurs. In effect, these statutes are a return
to the traditional statutes of limitations. See Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality
of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1683 (1983).
Maryland is the only state in which the discovery rule is applied to all civil
actions. See generally Note, Poffenberger v. Risser-7The Discovery Principle is the
Rule, Not the Exception, 40 MD. L. REV. 451 (1982).
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cases, judicially extended the statutes of limitations.1 46 While
the courts have recognized that it is the constitutional power of
the legislature to fix the time limits within statutes of limita-
tions, it is the function of the judiciary to construe the lan-
guage of the statutes "in a manner consistent with a prima
facie purpose to compel the exercise of a right within a reason-
able time without doing an avoidable injustice.' 1 47  As the
Washington Supreme Court has stated, the statute of limita-
tions "is not such a meritorious defense that either the law or
the fact should be strained in aid of it."'14
The Washington courts have determined that the language
of Revised Code of Washington sections 4.16.010 and 4.16.080(2)
is not precise, thus, the term "accrual" is open to interpreta-
tion. The Washington Supreme Court has noted that "the time
fixed for calculating the accrual of the cause of action becomes
general instead of specific [when the two statutes are read
together], and could as readily be said to commence with the
reasonable discovery of the injury as with the occurrence of
the event or omission which produced the alleged injury. 
' 149
"In other words, the word 'accrued' does not necessarily mean
the same thing in all contexts under all circumstances and for
all purposes. '"150
146. The concurring opinion in Tyson reasoned that it is the exclusive function of
the legislature to extend the discovery rule. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 80, 727 P.2d at 230.
In Ruth, however, the first case in which the discovery rule was adopted in
Washington, the court noted that as between the harm of being deprived of a remedy
and the harm of being sued, "the problem ... remains with the judiciary, for, unless
the legislature has acted definitively, the courts, as instruments of the common law
and in furtherance of this traditional rule to prevent injustice, should try to strike
such a balance." Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 665, 453 P.2d at 635.
147. Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wash. App. 393, 399, 461 P.2d 895, 900 (1980) (cause of
action for medical malpractice, including negligent diagnosis, accrues when negligence
or culpable conduct is discovered by patient).
148. Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. State, 66 Wash. 2d 570, 573, 403 P.2d 880, 882 (1965)
(time allowed within which taxpayer may apply for a refund of overpaid taxes is a
question of non-claim, not one of state of limitations, but the defense of the statute of
limitations is entitled to same consideration as any other defense). See generally
Rochester v. Tulp, 54 Wash. 2d 71, 337 P.2d 1062 (1959) (in action by executrix of an
estate for damages for the conversion of personal property, it was abuse of discretion
to refuse to reopen case for reception of new evidence after dismissal on grounds that
complaint was filed one day late and thus, barred by statute of limitations); Wickwire
v. Reard, 37 Wash. 2d 748, 226 P.2d 192 (1951) (in action upon a promissory note when
holder receives part payment, statute of limitations accrued when payment was made).
149. Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 666, 453 P.2d at 635.
150. Janisch, 1 Wash. App. at 399, 461 P.2d at 898.
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B. History of the Discovery Rule in Washington
The court's recognition that flexibility was needed in those
instances in which the injury did not arise immediately or was
apparent from the commission of a tortious act led to the
development of the discovery rule.15' The Washington
Supreme Court first adopted the discovery rule in a medical
malpractice case, Ruth v. Dight, in which the plaintiff claimed
that the physician negligently left a foreign substance or arti-
cle in the body of patient after closing the wound."5 2 The court
held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the
patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have discovered the injury. 53 The court in Ruth stressed the
knowledge of the blameless plaintiff who could not "in the
exercise of reasonable care for her own health and welfare"
know of her injury until exploratory surgery revealed the
source of her symptoms.TM
Acknowledging that theoretically it was impossible to jus-
tify the application of the discovery rule to one kind of medical
malpractice case and not to another, the Washington courts
extended the discovery rule to cases of negligent medical diag-
nosis in Janisch v. Mullins.'55 In Janisch, the patient alleged
that the physician's negligent diagnosis in 1958 resulted in the
loss of his vision, and that the physician fraudulently concealed
151. One of the first cases in Washington to apply the discovery principle was
Purdy v. State, 99 Wash. 638, 92 P.2d 880 (1939). In Purdy, the state sold shore lands to
a proprietor who, like the state, assumed the lake was navigable. Ten years later, the
proprietor brought an action to have the lake declared non-navigable and to recover
the purchase price. The court held that a judicial decree declaring the lake non-
navigable was a condition precedent to bringing the action. Thus, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the decree was declared. Id.
152. 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (holding that in cases involving
allegations of foreign substances left in surgical wounds, the statute of limitations
begins to run when the act occurred), (overruling Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d
675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954)).
153. Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 667-68, 453 P.2d at 636.
154. Id. at 667, 453 P.2d at 635. Cf. Denison v. Goforth, 75 Wash. 2d 853, 454 P.2d
218 (1969) (surgical knife left in plaintiff's body during removal of stomach tumor and
not discovered until eleven years later).
155. 1 Wash. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969). See generally Fraser v. Weeks, 76Wash. 2d 819, 456 P.2d 351 (1969) (statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases
involving negligent leaving of foreign substances or objects in surgical wound and
involving continuous course of treatment for same disease or condition does not begin
to run at time of alleged act of malpractice); cf. Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic, 11 Wash.
App. 936, 527 P.2d 689 (1974) (limitation period on action based on physician's
negligent failure to inform patient of risks in treatment begins to run when patient
knows or should know of physician's negligence).
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the diagnosis results until 1967. The court emphasized the
dependency of a patient on his physician: "As between the
patient and the physician, the dependence of the patient in
light of the duty of the physician to properly treat the patient
entitles the interest of the patient to a claim of higher
priority.""z
The Washington courts eventually made no distinction
between medical and other professionals and extended the dis-
covery rule to cases concerning land surveyors, 57 insurance
agents, 5 ' lawyers,'5 9 accountants, 60 and stockbrokers. 16  The
discovery rule has also been found to be appropriate in cases of
libel,16 2 products liability,163 latent disease cases,1M and inten-
tional torts.1
6 5
In Urie v. Thompson, 66 a latent disease case that is
referred to as the precursor of the discovery rule, the Supreme
Court clearly rejected the limitation of the discovery principle
to professions. Referring to Urie, the Seventh Circuit in
Stoleson v. United States' 67 stated:
Urie teaches us that it is the nature of the problems faced by
a plaintiff in discovering his injury and its cause, and not the
occupation of the defendant that governs the applicability of
the discovery rule. That a claim may or may not arise from
a physician's malpractice is purely incidental. We see no rea-
son to ameliorate the harsh consequences of the statute of
limitations in one category of cases to the exclusion of all
others. [Als Urie demonstrates, the rule was not created in a
medical malpractice context and is not limited to such
156. Janisch, 1 Wash. App. at 401, 461 P.2d at 899.
157. Kundahl v. Barnett, 5 Wash. App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164 (1971).
158. Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wash. 2d 215, 543 P.2d 338 (1975).
159. Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 552 P.2d 1053 (1976).
160. Hunter v. Knight, Vale and Gregory, 18 Wash. App. 640, 571 P.2d 212 (1977).
161. Hermann v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 17 Wash. App. 626,
563 P.2d 817 (1977).
162. Kittinger v. Boeing Co., 21 Wash. App. 484, 585 P.2d 812 (1978).
163. Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital, 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979); cf.
Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983).
164. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 344, 693 P.2d 687 (1985).
165. United States Oil & Refining Co. v. State of Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 96 Wash.
2d 85, 633 P.2d 1329 (1981).
166. 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (plaintiff who was exposed to silica dust for thirty years,
contracted silicosis. The court held that three year statute of limitations began to run
when plaintiff discovered the injury). For a discussion of this case, see Birnbaum,
Statutes of Limitations in Environmental Suits: The Discovery Rule Approach, 24
TRiAL 38, 39 (April 1980).
167. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
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cases. 16 8
As it is applied in Washington, the discovery rule is based
on certain principles: the blameless plaintiff does not and can-
not know of the injury, therefore knowledge is delayed and the
plaintiff is in a trust or fiduciary relationship with the defend-
ant. The courts also state that until a plaintiff suffers appreci-
able harm as a result of negligence an intentional tort, he
cannot establish a cause of action.169 In addition, it is not
enough for the plaintiff to discover the cause of the injury; he
must also discover all the essential elements of the possible
cause of action.'7 0 The running of the statutory period is
delayed despite the existence of a theoretical right to recover
until the later occurrence of an event that uncovers the ele-
ments of the action.171
In United States Oil & Refining Co. v. State of Washing-
ton, Department of Ecology, 72 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton most clearly stated the requisite test for the application of
the discovery rule. In the determination of whether to apply
the discovery rule, the possibility of stale claims must be bal-
anced against the unfairness of preventing justified causes of
action from being presented. 73 The court in that case held
that "the balancing test dictates the application of the rule
where the plaintiff lacks the means or ability to ascertain that
a wrong has been committed.' ' 74 The court stated that the
premise underlying limitation statutes, that the plaintiff has
the means and resources to detect wrongs within the applica-
ble limitation period, must prove to be inapplicable so that a
plaintiff would be denied a meaningful opportunity to bring a
warranted cause of action. 75
IX. APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE TO TYSON
The Tyson majority's concern for the nature of the plain-
tiff's injury resulted in an inadequate analysis with regard to
the discovery rule. Incestuous abuse cases such as Tyson fit
the necessary requirements for the application of the discovery
168. Id. at 1269.
169. Gazija, 86 Wash. 2d at 219, 543 P.2d at 341.
170. Ohler, 92 Wash. 2d at 511, 598 P.2d at 1360.
171. Hunter, 18 Wash. App. at 643, 571 P.2d at 215.
172. 96 Wash. 2d 85, 633 P.2d 1329 (1981).




752 University of Puget Sound Law Review
rule as it has been applied in Washington. Incest victims such
as the plaintiff in Tyson often psychologically repress any
memory of the abuse until long after the age of majority.
17
The plaintiff in Tyson did not know and could not discover the
harm until long after the abuse ended. In addition, even if a
victim remembers the abuse, she is unaware of the causal link
between the childhood abuse and problems experienced as an
adult.'77 The primary reason for the extension of the discovery
rule to cases of professional malpractice or intentional tort is
that the plaintiff does not necessarily have the means or the
ability to discover the cause of the harm.178 In the case of the
incest victim who experiences the devastating effects of years
of abuse, the ability to discover her psychological and emo-
tional relationship to the abuse and her abuser often comes
with therapy or professional help.
Psychological and emotional disorders are often not recog-
nized by the incest victim without professional help. Although
there has been much discussion of incest and child abuse, the
effects of the abuse have only recently been publicized.
7 9
Most experts agree that child sexual abuse has serious harmful
effects on its victims. However, the incest victim, such as the
plaintiff in Tyson, does not have enough knowledge of the
events to understand the harm or to file a suit against the
abuser.
The question of whether the plaintiff should have known
or discovered the elements of her claim is also considered by
the courts in the application of the discovery rule. This ques-
tion involves a test of reasonableness that requires juries to
decide whether the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in
asserting her claim' 0 and whether knowledge of the elements
of her cause of action should be imputed to the plaintiff. The
176. See supra notes 42-47.
177. See supra notes 48-58.
178. Peters, 87 Wash. 2d at 405, 552 P.2d at 1055.
179. Adams-Tucker, supra note 27.
180. One commentator points out that reasonableness can be determined early in
a proceeding, as well as later during trial. Through pleading requirements that make
the plaintiff allege the time, manner, and circumstances justifying the delayed
discovery of the harm allow the court is able to evaluate the reasonableness of the
delay early in the proceedings in most cases. In addition, procedural devices such as
summary judgment and directed verdict are available to challenge such justifications
at later stages in the proceeding. Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations:
California's Discovery Exception Swallows the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 117 (1980)
(hereinafter Accrual of Statutes of Limitations).
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trier of fact must consider: whether what the plaintiff remem-
bers are childhood experiences; her understanding of them;
what symptoms are manifested; whether she sought profes-
sional help; and whether such help was even available, depend-
ing on her awareness of and financial ability to obtain it. The
application of the discovery rule is governed by the rule of rea-
sonableness from the plaintiff's perspective.'8 '
In White v. Johns-Manville Corp.,182 the Washington
Supreme Court found it unreasonable to expect or require, "as
a matter of law," the ordinary wrongful death claimant "to ini-
tiate and conduct the massive research necessary to prove the
causal link between occupational exposure and resulting
cancer."183
As in White, it is not unreasonable for an incest victim
without professional training or sophistication to fail to con-
nect childhood incidents to her current physical and psycholog-
ical disorders, especially because most incest victims have
accepted, since childhood, the blame for the abuse. Most incest
victims expect upon leaving home to live normal lives. In most
cases, as in Tyson, victims seek help in order to deal with
problems with which they cannot cope. The incest victim who
represses her memory of the abuse cannot discover all the
essential elements of her possible cause of action until she not
only remembers the fact of the abuse, but also the connection
of the abuse to the resultant problems.
In all cases in which the discovery rule has been applied in
Washington, the courts have considered the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant in terms of dependency,
trust, and reliance.'84 In professional malpractice cases, the
blameless plaintiff relies and depends on the professional to
perform services and is unaware of the harm done because he
has relinquished control. There is no reason to restrict the
discovery rule to cases of professional malpractice. 8 5
181. Ruth, 75 Wash. 2d at 660, 453 P.2d at 631.
182. 103 Wash. 2d 344, 693 P.2d 687 (1985).
183. White, 103 Wash. 2d at 355, 693 P.2d at 594. For further discussion of the
factual determination of plaintiff's diligence in discovering their claims, see Sahlie, 99
Wash. at 550, 663 P.2d at 473; Gazia, 97 Wash. 2d at 215, 543 P.2d at 338; Ruth, 75 Wash.
2d at 660, 453 P.2d at 631.
184. Janish, 1 Wash. App. at 401, 461 P.2d at 899.
185. See supra note 169. One commentator suggests that limiting the discovery
rule to the professional context based on a high standard of care would be not only
awkward, but also inequitable to innocent plaintiffs "because it would dictate
drastically different access to compensation for equally harmed and diligent plaintiffs
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The Washington courts have focused, not on the profession
of the defendant, but on whether the defendant owes a duty to
the plaintiff because of the nature of the plaintiff's trust and
reliance on the defendant. In this respect, the facts of Tyson
and other incest abuse cases are analogous to cases in which
the court has applied the discovery rule. The incest victim
relies on her father's superior authority and knowledge. As
between the doctor and patient, lawyer and client, consumer
and manufacturer, the relationship between the child and par-
ent is an unequal one. The incestuous parent can take advan-
tage of the child because of her willingness to please and his
power over her as sole support. The incestuous parent edu-
cates the child into believing that incest is healthy and normal.
If the child is at all aware of the fact of incest, she has learned
to remain silent in order to protect her family and herself.
The father's power as a parent forces the incest victim not
only to tolerate, but to believe that she is somehow at fault.
18 6
The Washington courts have consistently protected the
integrity of the family.1 8 7 The courts have long held that
parental interest in the custody and the control of minor chil-
dren is a "sacred" right recognized at common law.8 8 How-
ever, the courts have also stated that children are not chattels
and that the rights of parents are measured against the dis-
charge of parental responsibilities."8 9 The Supreme Court of
Washington has defined parental obligations to mean at a mini-
mum: the expression of love and affection; the expression of
concern for the child's well-being; the duty to supply food,
clothing and medical care; the duty to provide a home; and the
duty to provide social and moral guidance. 9 °
The incestuous parent not only abuses his "sacred" right,
he unconscionably disregards his parental obligations. His
on the unrelated basis of whether the injurer is a professional." Accrual of Statutes of
Limitations, supra note 181, at 113.
186. See generally SUMMIT, supra note 5.
187. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (child may not be
subjected to surgical operation without consent of parents until parents are legally
deprived of custody and control).
188. Id at 685, 126 P.2d at 771.
189. In re Harney, 19 Wash. App. 85, 88, 574 P.2d 395, 397 (1978) (unfitness of
parent as ground for permanent deprivation of parental rights must be established by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence). See In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d
278 (1975) (juvenile court's finding that parent-child relationship had dissipated to a
point where child was incorrigible was supported by substantial evidence).
190. In re the Welfare of Farango, 23 Wash. App. 126, 595 P.2d 552 (1979) (court's
primary concern in a deprivation action is the welfare of the child).
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expression of "love" is coerced from a child who gives into his
demands and abuse out of fear. The child's well-being is not
even considered by the abuser, who does not think of the pres-
ent or future effects of the abuse on the child. The parental
duty to provide social and moral guidance is made a mockery
by the parent who educates the child into believing that the
abuse is acceptable and normal.
The fiduciary responsibilities of a parent to a child are
essential to the maintenance of society. The child incest victim
is unable to distinguish between a legitimate exercise of paren-
tal control and a breach of parental duty. Although the courts
in Washington have zealously supported parental rights, they
must with equal zeal protect innocent children by promoting
parental duties. Applying the discovery rule to incest cases
would satisfy this goal.
In Tyson, as in other incest cases, it is the defendant's
alleged conduct that caused the injury. The conduct of the
defendant in contributing to the plaintiff's lack of discovery of
claim is an important factor in applying the discovery rule to
cases of intentional torts. In United States Oil & Refining
Co.,' the Department of Ecology had to rely on industry
reporting to discover discharging of pollutants in violation of
the law. United States Oil did not properly report its dis-
charges and discovery of the violations was delayed until the
Department of Ecology suspected that monitoring reports were
inaccurate and then began investigating. The court noted that
by failing to report, industries could escape penalties, and if
the discovery rule was not applied, blameless plaintiffs would
be penalized while clever defendants would be rewarded.'92
The court stated that "neither the purpose for statutes of limi-
tations nor justice is served when the statute runs while the
information concerning the injury is in the defendant's
hands.",i
93
The incestuous parent controls the victim who is coerced
into silence. He slowly initiates her into an abusive relation-
ship that he assures her is normal. The child victim has no
way of determining the normalcy of such relationships. The
conspiracy of silence that envelopes the relationship does not
permit the child to report the abuse. Even when the child
191. 96 Wash. 2d 85, 633 P.2d 1329 (1981).
192. Id at 94, 633 P.2d at 1333-34.
193. Id at 94, 633 P.2d at 1334.
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senses that the relationship is wrong, she is unable to break
the silence because of threats or fear. Application of the dis-
covery rule to Tyson and other incest cases would insure that
the blameworthy defendant is penalized for his wrongful
conduct.
One commentator has noted that when the notion that
defendants should not be burdened forever by potential liabil-
ity is balanced with the basic principle of justice that a diligent
plaintiff should be guaranteed a remedy for a legal wrong, the
statute of limitations, which bars relief to blameless victims
who have no means to avoid their situation, is a violation of
this guarantee of justice." In addition, the defendant's guar-
antee of repose is not an absolute guarantee. 95 Repose gives
the defendant freedom from facing the consequences of his
own actions, but it is given only upon a tardy and inactive
plaintiff's failure to act diligently in pursuing a claim. How-
ever, "if this fairness consideration is the basis of the guarantee
of defendants repose, the policy is clearly not applicable where
a worthy plaintiff, exercising due diligence, could not discover
a cause of action within the limitations period."'' 9
The court's objections to the application of the discovery
rule in Tyson arise primarily from a fear of false or stale
claims, which are deemed to be inherently suspicious because
memories fade and witnesses may not be available. Yet the
Washington courts applied the discovery rule in Ohler,9"
where twenty-one years had elapsed, and in White,9 8 where
thirty-eight years had elapsed. In addition, there is concern for
the use of fresh evidence. The lack of objective verification of
one or more elements of a claim is a potential problem in any
case. Nevertheless, the Washington courts have applied the
discovery rule to latent disease cases such as Sahlie v. Johns-
Manville Corp. ,'" where fresh, tangible proof was unavailable.
The extension of the discovery rule to Tyson and other
incest cases is both fair and just to both parties. The blameless
victim would be given the opportunity to recover for her suf-
fering. The blameless defendant would most likely be vindi-
cated. The greatest risk is not that a certain number of
194. Accrual of Statutes of Limitations, supra note 180, at 119.
195. Id
196. Id.
197. 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
198. 103 Wash. 2d 344, 693 P.2d 687 (1985).
199. 99 Wash. 2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983).
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blameless defendants will be falsely accused or prosecuted, but
rather that without giving incest victims access to the courts,
incest will continue to be tolerated by society at the expense of
the lives and health of innocent children.
X. CONCLUSION
The court in Tyson had an opportunity to aid many victims
of incestuous abuse. Its refusal to apply the discovery rule in
cases of repeated incestuous abuse in which the victim has
repressed the memory of the events is an injustice to those
children who have suffered at the hands of abusive parents.
The Washington courts have consistently applied the discovery
rule in cases in which a blameless victim is unable to discover,
through no fault of his own, his cause of action. The courts
have focused on the plaintiff, as well as the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant. In those cases in which
the discovery rule has been applied, the defendant has had
knowledge unknown to the plaintiff or has had unequal con-
trol. The courts have considered plaintiff's trust and reliance
on the defendant, as well as the duty owed to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in Tyson is a model of many incest victims.
She is a blameless victim who, as a child, trusted and relied on
the authority of her father, only to be exploited and abused.
Coerced and caught within a web of secrecy and silence, she is
unable to report the abuse. Instead, she learns how to cope
and eventually blocks out the memory of the abuse.
Because of the latent nature and delayed recognition of
the effects of incestuous abuse, the incest victim remains igno-
rant of the incest-related injuries until events in her life or
therapy trigger her memory. Until she can "discover" her
injury, she has no cause of action against her abuser. In light
of the research produced by the medical and health care pro-
fessionals that has focused on child abuse and its effects, and
our current concern for victims of such abuse, it is unreasona-
ble for the legal system to deny the victims of incestuous abuse
access to the courts to redress their grievances.
Naomi Berkowitz
1987]
